Saguisag fully backs me on DAP and shares a startling suspicion

And an SC Justice agrees with my interpretation of Section 25 (5) of the Constitution

Exclusive by Raïssa Robles

Boy, who would have thought such an esoteric, abstract article would stir up so much commotion and interest? It’s not about a sex scandal. Not a bomb blast or a natural disaster. There’s no video, no sound, no music.

And yet my story, “President Aquino’s dead mom, President Cory, may yet save her son from jail over DAP”, seems to have kicked an anthill. No, several anthills. Which is strange, because it has nothing but ideas in it – no lurid pictures, even.

The  article raised questions about the Supreme Court recent ruling on the Disbursement Acceleration Program.

The reason it caused an uproar is that a lot of political and personal things are tied up with the court ruling. The story validated or invalidated a person’s support or non-support of Aquino. Many people wanted to believe in him and his Matuwid na Daan. But the DAP ruling messed up that belief.

Also, let’s face it, Filipinos are legalistic and love any argument on laws.

Let’s briefly go over that story, shall we?

The heart of the Supreme Court ruling was that Aquino’s Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) was partly unconstitutional because it violated Section 25 (5) Article VI of the Constitution which states that:

“(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings to other items of the respective appropriations.”

The SC said the word “respective” in this section bars “cross-border transfers” of funds. “Cross-border” means from  one branch to another, for instance from the Executive to the Legislative, or the Judiciary.

According to the High Court, the Executive branch headed by PNoy violated this ban because it transferred appropriations beyond its executive border to at least two independent bodies – Congress (a co-equal and independent branch) and to the Commission on Audit (an independent constitutional commission).

In my story , I raised the possibility that perhaps the Supreme Court could review its ruling on DAP because DAP is based on two sections of the Administrative Code, which by themselves have not been declared unconstitutional. Section 38, Chapter V of Book VI of the Admin Code allows the President to stop or suspend expenditures on projects; Section 49 of the same chapter allows him to redirect the money from these projects into other economic activities.

Specifically, I noted that the finding of unconstitutionality rested mainly on Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution. And I wrote:

But what if there already existed a law authorizing the President to go beyond the limits set by Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution? If you look at the wording of Section 25 (5) – “No law shall be passed” – the ban is prospective, not retrospective.

What if the existing law happens to be the Administrative Code of 1987?

The SC was aware of the existence of the Administrative Code of 1987 which President Corazon Aquino had legislated into law two days before the first post-Martial Law Congress convened. In its ruling on DAP, the court said Chapter 5, Section 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987 – which Budget Secretary Butch Abad had cited as one of the legal bases for DAP – did not give the President the power to pool funds into what they called the DAP.

I then posed the following argument:

The DAP is unconstitutional if you only look at the 1987 Constitution and Chapter 5, Section 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987 – which is what the justices did.

The DAP becomes constitutional if you look at the 1987 Constitution AND Sections 38 and 49 of Chapter 5 of the Administrative Code of 1987. Because Section 38 gives the President the power to create savings and Section 49 gives the President the power to pool those savings into a fund like DAP.

You need both Section 38 and Section 49, Chapter 5 of the Administrative Code to make DAP LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL.

Without Section 49, DAP becomes illegal and unconstitutional.

Again, boy did I get it.

People I knew — and didn’t know — were lining up, scrambling over each other to tell me about the inadequacy of my knowledge of law and (by implication) the lofty superiority of their mastery of said subject.

Someone who called himself “killem_01” posted this remark on my website:

“The fatal error of the independent journalist is that she assumed that the Sec. 25 of the Constitution will not apply to admin code and further, assumed that sec.38 and 49 authorized gross boarder transfer

That assumption is clearly erroneous and misleading. But what will you expect from a independent journalist…”

Ouch. Tell me, oh anonymous commenter killem01, what DO you expect?

A former classmate in college who went on to become a brilliant lawyer gently lectured me on Facebook, saying:

“It’s understandable for a non-lawyer to think that the words “no law shall be passed…” impact or affect only laws enacted after 1987 when the Constitution was ratified. In fact, those words have both retroactive and prospective effect. They impose an absolute prohibition, qualified only by the express exceptions that follow those words. To say that the Administrative Code of 1987 qualifies the Constitution makes our whole normative system stand on its head. The Constitution, as your father taught generations of law students in UP Law, trumps all Congressional enactments or executive fiats.”

In case people are wondering, he was referring to my late father, Prof. Jose F. Espinosa, who was once Dean of the evening law of the University of the Philippines College of Law. He was a renowned terror professor.

Anyway, the negative reactions to my story can be broken down into three points:

(1) The Constitution is clear.
(2) The SC decision is unanimous.
(3) I’m not a lawyer. Who am I to talk and how dare I PRESUME to question the Supreme Court?

There’s actually a fourth point, how do you define “savings” – which I’ll leave for another story (it’s complicated and as long as this and I need to post illustrations).

Anyway, what can I say to the three points? This: at least they got one thing right – I’m not a lawyer.

As for the other two? Let’s get the ball rolling, shall we?

I should say  first off that in the course of the week I also happen to have gotten opinions from quite a few lawyers who SUPPORT my position or find them legally tenable..

So, seeing as how I’m not a lawyer, or, even married to one, why don’t we listen to a couple of people who happen to be lawyers? In fact pretty serious ones. Why don’t we listen to former senator Rene Saguisag and a sitting member of the Supreme Court?

Let’s start with Supreme Court Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo, who submitted a “concurring and dissenting” opinion on DAP.

I nearly fell off my seat when I reread del Castillo’s explanation of his vote finding DAP partly unconstitutional.

Recall that Section 25 (5) states [with my emphasis added]:

“(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings to other items of the respective appropriations.”

Recall that my critics have said the phrase “no law shall be passed” INCLUDES the Administrative Code that came into effect two days before Congress convened. Therefore, they said, Section 49 of the Administrative Code that allows cross-border transfer can be considered revoked or voided by Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Or reinterpreted in the light of Section 25 (5).

My critics’ interpretation of the phrase “no law shall be passed” turned out to be wrong —  at least, that’s what Justice del Castillo said in his opinion on what Section 25 (5) of the Constitution means.

He wrote on page 4 of his 56-page opinion [with my emphasis added]:

“The subject constitutional provision prohibits the transfer of appropriations. Congress cannot pass a law authorizing such transfer. However, it is allowed to enact a law to authorize the heads of offices to transfer savings from one item to another provided that the items fall within the appropriations of the same office: the President relative to the Executive Department, the Senate President with respect to the Senate, the Speaker relative to the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice with respect to the Judicial Department, and the heads of the constitutional bodies relative to their respective offices.”

Notice that Del Castillo used the word “Congress”. In other words, Del Castillo limits the constitutional prohibition only to all laws passed by Congress.

What does this mean? As even my lawyer-critics would concede, under the rules of statutory construction (which simply means the manner of making laws and interpreting them), if you negate only one specific instance, then all other things of a similar nature are allowed. A crude example: if a security guard tells you “you cannot enter through this door” that does not mean he’s banning you from entering through other doors, just not this door.

In short, while Congress cannot pass a law; President Corazon Aquino could and did, using her legislative powers that were recognized by the 1987 Constitution. And her law is exempt from the ban imposed on Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.

After all, it was her who directed the framing of a new Constitution using her powers under the Freedom Constitution. It would have been absurd if the 1987 Constitution had duly restricted her powers to legislate in the interim period between the constitution’s ratification and the convening of Congress.  That would have left a dangerous vacuum.

The critics might then say – but Del Castillo did not mention President Aquino.

And I would answer them this way. Del Castillo was the lone justice who bothered to explain the relation between the Constitution, the General Appropriations Acts (or yearly national budgets passed by Congress), and the Administrative Code of 1987.

He described the GAA as “the implementing legislation of the constitutional provisions” pertaining to the budget. Then he said the GAA is at the same time “governed by the Administrative Code.”

Here is what Justice del Castillo wrote on page 10 of his “concurring and dissenting” opinion:

Consequently, considering that the GAA (1) is the implementing legislation of the constitutional provisions on the enactment of the national budget under Article VI, and (2) is governed by Book VI (“National Government Budgeting”) of the Administrative Code…”

Note that Book VI contains Sections 38 and 49, which I alluded to.

Like the other justices, Del Castillo discussed the powers of the President on the budget under Sec. 38, but not under Section 49 of the Administrative Code. I don’t know why.

Section 38 gives the President the broad powers to suspend or stop all “expenditures” except for salaries of permanent personnel:

Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. – Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees.

But Section 49 extends the power of the President to use savings generated by the stoppage of projects for a wide range of activities.

Here are the pertinent portions of Section 49:

SECTION 49. Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes. — Savings in the appropriations provided in the General Appropriations Act may be used for the settlement of the following obligations incurred during a current fiscal year or previous fiscal years as may be approved by the Secretary in accordance with rules and procedures as may be approved by the President:

(9) Priority activities that will promote the economic well-being of the nation, including food production, agrarian reform, energy development, disaster relief, and rehabilitation.

(10) Repair, improvement and renovation of government buildings and infrastructure and other capital assets damaged by natural calamities;

I know, Justice Del Castillo is highly controversial for his ruling on the comfort women and the allegations of plagiarism against him. But 10 of his colleagues dismissed the charge in 2010. Which means they trusted him and his judgment.

Another argument I would raise – to show that the “no law should be passed” phrase pertains to Congress alone – came from @Baycas, one of the regular commenters on my site. Baycas pointed out that Section 25 (5) appears under Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the “Legislative Department.” Again, using statutory construction, we should expect that all sections under Article VI would refer only to the powers of the Legislative Department in relation to the other branches of government.

Now things get interesting. Some sources pointed out to me that Apparently, I had missed another important section in the Administrative Code that Secretary Abad had used as one of his legal bases to justify DAP.

This is Section 39.

I counter-checked by reading again the 92-page DAP ruling penned by Justice Lucas Bersamin. The sources were right. On pages 43-47, Bersamin reprinted the entire National Budget Circular No. 541 dated July 18, 2012 signed by Abad, and which the solicitor general had submitted as part of the evidence.

The first two paragraphs of Abad’s National Budget Circular No. 541 states the legal bases for withdrawing funds and pooling these into a DAP [my emphasis added]:

The DBM, as mandated by Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), periodically reviews and evaluates the departments/agencies’ efficiency and effectiveness in utilizing budgeted funds for the delivery of services and production of goods, consistent with the government priorities.

In the event that a measure is necessary to further improve the operational efficiency of the government, the President is authorized to suspend or stop further use of funds allotted for any agency or expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act. Withdrawal and pooling of unutilized allotment releases can be effected by DBM based on authority of the President, as mandated under Sections 38 and 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of EO 292.

I missed Section 39 earlier because I had looked at another legal document that Justice Bersamin had alluded to as part of the submitted evidence on DAP.

Section 39 is important for the following reason.

The court ruled that the action by the executive department to undertake cross-border transfers in order, for instance, to enable Congress to complete its e-library was unconstitutional because this violated Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. No transfer of appropriations between independent branches of government.

But in the 2012 circular I cited, Abad justified such cross-border transfers using Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administration Code (also known as Executive Order 292).

I had earlier glanced at Section 39 but dismissed it because I thought it only had to do with deficit-spending by the national government.

It turns out that Section 39 gives a very narrow and plain meaning of “deficit”. It simply means when funds run short to complete a project or kung nagkulang.

Here is Section 39 which Abad pointed to as the section that enabled him to pool funds [my emphasis added]:

SECTION 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.—Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from budgetary savings except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that whenever authorized positions are transferred from one program or project to another within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated for personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however increasing the total outlay for personal services of the department, office or agency concerned.

This is the section of the Admin Code that justified Abad’s giving Congress P43 million to complete its e-library.

But apparently, even Abad forgot to stress this point when he was closely questioned on cross-border transfers by Justice Bersamin.

Bersamin enclosed in the main ruling a portion where he had questioned Abad on cross-border transfer:

JUSTICE BERSAMIN: Alright, the whole time that you have been Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, did the Executive Department ever redirect any part of savings of the National Government under your control cross border to another department?

SECRETARY ABAD: Well, in the Memos that we submitted to you, such an instance, Your Honor

JUSTICE BERSAMIN: Can you tell me two instances? I don’t recall having read your material.

SECRETARY ABAD: Well, the first instance had to do with a request from the House of Representatives. They started building their e-library in 2010 and they had a budget for about 207 Million but they lack about 43 Million to complete its 250 Million requirements. Prior to that, the COA, in an audit observation informed the Speaker that they had to continue with that construction otherwise the whole building, as well as the equipments therein may suffer from serious deterioration. And at that time, since the budget of the House of Representatives was not enough to complete 250 Million, they wrote to the President requesting for an augmentation of that particular item, which was granted, Your Honor. The second instance in the Memos is a request from the Commission on Audit. At the time they were pushing very strongly the good governance programs of the government and therefore, part of that is a requirement to conduct audits as well as review financial reports of many agencies. And in the performance of that function, the Commission on Audit needed information technology equipment as well as hire consultants and litigators to help them with their audit work and for that they requested funds from the Executive and the President saw that it was important for the Commission to be provided with those IT equipments and litigators and consultants and the request was granted, Your Honor.

JUSTICE BERSAMIN: These cross border examples, cross border augmentations were not supported by appropriations…

SECRETARY ABAD: They were, we were augmenting existing items within their…
(interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN: No, appropriations before you augmented because this is a cross border and the tenor or text of the Constitution is quite clear as far as I am concerned. It says here, “The power to augment may only be made to increase any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices.” Did you not feel constricted by this provision?

SECRETARY ABAD: Well, as the Constitution provides, the prohibition we felt was on the transfer of appropriations, Your Honor. What we thought we did was to transfer savings which was needed by the Commission to address deficiency in an existing item in both the Commission as well as in the House of Representatives; that’s how we saw…(interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN: So your position as Secretary of Budget is that you could do that?

SECRETARY ABAD: In an extreme instances because…(interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN: No, no, in all instances, extreme or not extreme, you could do that, that’s your feeling.

SECRETARY ABAD: Well, in that particular situation when the request was made by the Commission and the House of Representatives, we felt that we needed to respond because we felt…(interrupted).

In other words, Abad forgot that in his National Budget Circular No. 541 dated July 18, 2012 – and signed by him – he had cited Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code as the legal bases for such cross-border transfers.

Reading the 92-page Decision penned by Bersamin, I got the impression that he did not think much of the presidential powers given by the Administrative Code of 1987.

Because on pages 51 to 54, Bersamin gave a history of the president’s power to transfer funds starting with the year 1902. But he stopped with 1977 when then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No 1177, entitled “Revising the budget process in order to institutionalize the budgetary innovations of the New Society.” Bersamin made no mention at all of the Administration Code of 1987.

I had wondered why former Senator Joker Arroyo had called PNoy an “evil genius” for using the Admin Code.

Joker Arroyo told DZBB recently:

“Cory signed it (the Admin Code) in 1987 and yet up to the end of her term in 1992, she never used it. The question now lies, why P-Noy used it 25 years after it was signed?”

“It seems that P-Noy and Marcos thought alike. Cory did not use it. I am astounded why that admin code was used.”

I am puzzled why Arroyo has never mentioned his role in the passage of the Admin Code, through Executive Order No. 292 which he co-signed with Pres. Cory.

Out of curiosity, I decided to compare Marcos’ PD 1177 (issued on July 30, 1977) with Chapter 5 of the Admin Code.

It turns out, PD 1177 was almost bodily inserted into the Admin Code as its Chapter 5.

In short, Sections 38, 39 and 49 of the Admin Code, which Abad used as legal bases, came from PD 1177.

When Ex-Sen. Joker Arroyo called PNoy an “evil genius”, he did not explain why PD 1177 ended up inside the Admin Code.

The provisions of PD 1177 are all there in Chapter V of the Admin Code except for one section. Section 44 of PD 1177 is missing in the Admin Code. Section 44 authorizes the President “to transfer any fund” to anywhere for any reason. Here it is below:

Section 44.Authority to Approve Fund Transfers. The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project, or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive Department in the General Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of another department, bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 16 (5) of the Constitution.

Bersamin’s ruling on DAP indicated why Section 44 was not inserted into the Admin Code. Bersamin said in 1987 the Supreme Court had struck down the first paragraph of Section 44 for contravening Section 16(5) of the 1973 Constitution. Bersamin said, quoting the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Demetria vs. Alba:

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under said Section 16. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

It is significant that Demetria was promulgated 25 days after the ratification by the people of the 1987 Constitution, whose Section 25(5) of Article VI is identical to Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
Section 25. x x x
x x x x
5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Does this mean then that all the rest of PD 1177 which were inserted into the Admin Code of 1987 remain in effect and are part of the laws of the land? And therefore, when Abad and PNoy used Sections 38, 29 and 49 of the Code to justify DAP, they were acting in a lawful manner?

It is for this reason that I hope the Supreme Court would revisit its decision on DAP.

Not just on the constitutionality of Sections 38, 39, and 49 of Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code. But also on how these sections affect the very definition of what constitutes “savings” and can these savings be pooled into a new fund for projects that were not even mentioned in the General Appropriations Act.

In addition, the justices could perhaps revisit their comments on whether Abad and PNoy acted on good faith when they used the Admin Code.

Now let’s go to Saguisag

I would not have been able to write my first piece if I did not have the opinion of a prominent lawyer to back me up – that my arguments were “legally defensible.”

A couple of those who read my piece suggested that perhaps, Saguisag told that to me because he was just being polite.

“Polite” is the last thing I associate with the maverick ex-senator.

After my piece had come out, Saguisag sent me an email he had circulated to a group with whom he discusses political happenings:

Raissa is not a lawyer as far as I can tell but had a a very good lawyer for a father. She and hubby are makulit journalists, fact-checkers, and have a passion for precision in expression. Persnickety. Ang kulit!

The kind we need in what is otherwise a Wild Wild Press validating that media is the plural of mediocre. – Rocky Bridges.

Not the type who would see something he does not understand and proceed to explain it. Arthur Hoppe

He also told his e-mail group:

I know Raissa’s father, Joe Espinosa, who shared my passion for Scholastic Philosophy. He was with us in defending Joe Burgos & Co. in the We Forum trial (where I was cited for contempt twice, first fined and then imprisoned).

When I wrote “Who’s Afraid of Mary Jane?” in Mr. & Ms. in August, 1983, Joe told me his wife was upset that I would espouse legalizing marijuana. (I could not tell whether he was Super-Takusa like me.)

I doubt that legal amazon Raissa is a lawyer but she speaks below far better than attorneys (and certain Senators, I just heard one on TV whose subjects and predicates quarrelled)(Is hubby Alan also a Takusa?)

Her presentation is what I expect of my studes: grammatically correct, legally tenable, intellectually respectable and psychologically satisfying. The Supreme Court may shoot it down but here we see why no one should prejudge. Some Justices should be told, wait a minute, instead of prejudging and condemning Butch.

When Bobby Tanada and I were in the Palace last July 1, for Edca, part of the material given us was precisely what Raissa discussed below, which I look at now more carefully, rather than casually as I did then, because of some Fire!-Aim!-Ready! prejudgments and complaints.

Raissa has clearly discussed why a bona-fides assertion on tough legal issues will fly-high-blue-eagle-fly.

When I wrote my piece, I was not aware that the presidential palace was following the same legal track. I interviewed no one from there because I wanted to maintain my independence as a journalist.

I am elated and humbled by what Saguisag has written about me and my DAP story.

But in the end, I would like to ask readers to judge my DAP stories on the basis of my arguments.

Before I close this piece, let me share with you what Saguisag and I also talked about when I asked him about the DAP.

When I asked him, “Do you think my reading is correct or incorrect?

He said, “it’s legally defensible.”

I said, “Can this be a ground for a motion for reconsideration?”

Saguisag said, “To me, it’s a respectable basis. But you cannot make 15 men and women change their minds.”

I asked him again just to make sure, “So what I told you is defensible, about cross-border transfers being legal under the Admin Code?”

And Saguisag replied, “That’s what the Supreme Court does with their Judiciary Development Fund through the chief justice. Pag sinabing gagamitin lang yan for local personnel benefits, pag ginamit mo sa kurtina at biyahe, that’s another border crossing.”

Yep, he raises the possibility that the Supreme Court may have done exactly what it declared to be unconstitutional.

Saguisag expressed suspicion that the Court might have engaged in cross-border transfers in the past, but he conceded there was no proof.

It was only this weekend that I realized what could possibly, really change the mind of the Supreme Court justices – if someone comes up with proof that the Supreme Court had done what the justices said in the ruling that the executive department cannot do. If the court has even once accepted any cross-border funding from the executive branch at any time in the last 27 years.

It would not be the fault of the sitting justices if this had happened before their time. It would simply show that cross-border transfers are constitutional.

But then again, even without this, I’m hoping that public opinion may persuade the court to at least conduct a review of the constitutionality of Sections 38, 39 and 49 of the Admin Code as the legal bases for the DAP. So that future presidents can be guided.

I am posting below the Supreme Court decision on the DAP, along with the concurring and dissenting opinions.

To all those who think I’m always on the side of President Aquino, they’ve chosen to ignore that to this day I am against, and have written extensively about two of the laws PNoy has signed and which are now in effect:

The Cybercrime Prevention Law

The amendments to the Intellectual Property Code

I believe both laws diminish the rights of ordinary Filipinos and I will continue to fight against both laws.

I am also FOR a law he has yet to fully back, namely the Freedom of Information Act. This I believe will empower ordinary Filipinos.

_______________________________________

Here is a link to my previous story:

President Aquino’s dead mom, President Cory, may yet save her son from jail over DAP

Below is the Decision penned by Justice Lucas Bersamin:

Below is the concurring and dissenting opinion of  Justice Mariano del Castillo:

Below is the separate opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio:

Below is the separate opinion of Justice Arturo Brion:

Below is the concurring opinion of Justice Marvic Leonen:

Below is the separate concurring opinion of Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe: